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INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION OF MINERAL SERVITUDE -
DRILLING ON ONE HALF OF LEASED TRACT
Louisana. The case of Smith v. Holt1 presents the problem of
whether the drilling of a well on the west half of a tract will inter-
rupt prescription of the mineral servitude as to the east half of the
tract, both halves being covered by one mineral lease.
Defendant, owner of a forty-acre tract, sold the east half and
west half, reserving to himself in each sale all the minerals in
both tracts. Plaintiff acquired the east half. Defendant executed
an oil, gas and mineral lease covering the full forty acres.
The Louisana Department of Conservation, after notice and
hearing, established a spacing pattern allowing only one well per
forty-acre unit. The lessee obtained a permit and drilled a pro-
ducer on the west half. No drilling was done on the east half of
the tract.
Plaintiff contended that drilling and production on the west half
did not interrupt prescription of the mineral servitude on the east
half; therefore, the ten-year liberative prescription had extin-
guished the servitude on the east half. He also claimed that the
order of the Conservation Commission was nothing more than a
general spacing order for the whole area and was not intended to
operate as a pooling order, which requires a separate order.
Defendant contended that the lessees from the mineral owner
of the entire tract under a single lease embracing the two servi-
tudes, were the sole "owner" as defined in Section 2(h) of Act
157 of 1940;2 that a permit to drill having been obtained by them,
it had the effect of an agreement to pool their interests and to de-
velop the land as a pooling unit, thus requiring no separate order
1 ........... La -----------,67 So. 2d 93 (1953).
2 17 LA. REV. STAT. (West, 1951) § 30:3 (8).
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of pooling, which is required only in cases of forced pooling.
Therefore, the well on the west half, but in the forty-acre unit,
interrupted prescription of the east half of the tract.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, holding for defendant, said that
contractual relations and property rights of persons must yield
to a proper exercise of the police power. Only in the case of forced
pooling is an order "requiring such pooling" necessary. The same
equitable distribution may be accomplished by convention; and
obviously, where there is a sole owner of a unit, a pooling order
could serve no useful purpose. Also, the plaintiff, having only a
reversionary right to the mineral interest he claimed, would have
been without interest to oppose a pooling order if one had been
sought.
This case involved the problem of which right, plaintiff's or
defendant's, must yield to the other. Plaintiff, owner of the re-
version on the east half, had the right to the property if a well was
not drilled on the east half within the ten-year prescriptive period.
On the other hand, defendant, owner of the mineral servitude, had
the right to drill only one well on the forty-acre tract in obedience
to the order of the Conservation Department. And here the court
held that as a matter of public policy the prescription statutes
must yield to the regulatory order under the state conservation
statutes.
A question raised by the case is whether the doctrine pro-
nounced is applicable to contiguous lands outside the production
unit. A recent discussion in the Oil and Gas Reporter' says that
the answer will depend upon whether the rationale of the decision
is that the exercise of the servitude has the effect of interrupting
the prescription or is that the reserved mineral rights were con-
tinued in effect because of the "obstacle" theory, i.e., the conserva-
tion order prohibited drilling of more than one well.
3 Note, 2 OIL & GAs REP. 1401 (1953).
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If the former explanation be true, then the mineral servitude
would continue under the rule that exercise of a servitude upon a
tract of land interrupts the prescription as to all contiguous lands
covered by the same servitude.4 If the latter explanation be true,
the servitude would be extinguished as to the contiguous lands
since there is no "obstacle," i.e., the order did not prohibit the
drilling on a tract outside the forty-acre unit.
Another answer to the same question will depend upon whether
in the future the Louisiana Supreme Court will apply the doctrine
of Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co.5 and Smith v. Carter Oil Co.6 Those
cases held that production on any lands within the compulsorily
pooled unit, even though from a well not covered by the lease,
maintains the servitude in effect even on lands covered by the
lease but not within the pooled unit.
Therefore, under the theory that mineral servitudes are indi-
visible, the rule of the principal case may be applied to contiguous
lands outside the production unit.
CONSTRUCTION OF OIL PAYMENT PROVISION -SEPARATE
LEASES - PAYMENTS DUE OUT OF EITHER OR BOTH?
Oklahoma. The case of Tilley v. Allied Materials Corporation1
involves the construction of an oil payment provision. Under a
drilling contract, the driller agreed to drill two wells on two sepa-
rate leases, receiving in return cash and a $30,000 oil payment
to be paid out of 1/4 of 7/8 of the first oil produced from the leases.
Both wells were producers, the first producing oil and the second
producing gas.
Tilley, the driller, contended that as the first lease produced oil,
this lease was obligated to pay the full $30,000 oil payment out
4 Lenard v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 265, 29 So. 2d 844 (1947).
I 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
6 104 F. Supp. 463 (W. D. La. 1952).
7 ------------ Okla -------- 256 P. 2d 1110 (1953).
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of the Y of 7/8 of the first oil produced after he had completed his
contract by drilling both wells.
Allied contended that under the reformed contract Tilley was
only entitled to receive $15,000 out of 1/4 of 7/ working interest
from the first well drilled. In a previous case Tilley had sued to
reform the contract, and the court had ordered that the contract
should be reformed to provide for the payment of $15,000 to be
paid out of 1/4 of the production of gas as well as oil accruing to
the two leases. The purpose of the suit was to include gas as a
source from which payments should be made. Allied claimed that
by this suit Tilley was entitled only to $15,000 oil payment out
of the first lease.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held for Tilley. It said that the
earlier suit was not res judicata since issues were not drawn as
to whether Tilley was entitled to the $30,000 oil payment out
of the first well or out of both wells, or whether the first well was
solely liable to an oil payment of $15,000.
This case illustrates the important difference between an oil
payment and a production payment. An oil payment is limited
to production of oil while a production payment covers oil, gas
and other subsurface minerals.
CONSTRUCTION OF WELL COMPLETION CLAUSES- WHAT
IS A DRY HOLE?
Oklahoma, Texas. Two of the most controversial cases decided
in 1953 were Rogers v. Osborn8 and Skelly Oil Co. v. Wickham,9
These cases dealt with the problem of whether a lease was ex-
tended after the primary term by drilling operations on a well
commenced during the primary term and continued after the
primary term until it was completed as a non-producer, plus the
drilling of a second well, which was a producer, after the end of
8 ------ Tex.----- 261 S. W. 2d 311 (1953).
9202 F. 2d 442 (10th Cir. 1953).
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the primary term but before the completion of the first well. In
both cases the lessors sued to have the lease terminated, and the
lessees claimed that the lease had been extended by drilling
operations carried on at the end of the primary term. Hence,
said the lessees, a second well commenced before completion of
the first well within the extended period resulting in a producer
maintained the lease in force under the "thereafter" clause.
In the Rogers case the clause in question was as follows:
If prior to discovery of oil or gas on said land Lessee should drill a
dry hole or holes thereon, or if after discovery of oil or gas the produc-
tion thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate
if lessee commences additional drilling or re-working operations within
sixty (60) days thereafter or (if it be within the primary term) com-
mences or resumes the payments or tender of rentals .... If at the expi-
ration of the primary term oil, gas or other mineral is not being
produced on said land but lessee is then engaged in drilling or re-work-
ing operations thereon, this lease shall remain in force so long as
operations are prosecuted with no cessation of more than thirty (30)
consecutive days, and if they result in the production of oil, gas or
other mineral so long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced
from said land .... (Emphasis added.)
The Texas Supreme Court held that the first well did not result
in a dry hole, or at least the dry-hole clause had no application,
since the lessees sought and obtained a jury finding that Well
No. 1 was not dry. Nor was there cessation of production, since
there never was any production. The court in giving the 30-day
clause a strict construction said that the clause did not refer to
drilling operations on new wells but applied instead only to par-
ticular drilling or re-working operations being carried on at the
end of the primary term.
The 60-day clause presented the first problem. Was Well No. 1
in fact a dry hole? Were lessees estopped from asserting other-
wise by their seeking and obtaining a jury finding that it was not
a dry hole? What effect would the court's holding have on a
lessee's desire to drill and develop a lease?
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It is submitted that Well No. 1 was a dry hole, as that term
was used in the lease, and that the lease should have been ex-
tended for 60 days under the St. Louis Royalty Co.1" holding. The
intention of the parties surely was not to express or imply a
strict limitation on the term "dry hole." The parties wanted a
producer, and undoubtedly the lessors wanted the lessees to drill
and develop the lease until they discovered a producer. If not,
why was the provision inserted in the lease to encourage addi-
tional drilling after a well failed to produce? If a well, after
completion with due diligence, cannot be made to produce, is it
not a dry well in the parlance of the oil industry?
The supreme court held that "since lessees sought and obtained
a finding that Well No. 1 was not dry, the dry hole clause has no
application." So if the question is purely one of fact, the jury's
finding would bind lessees. It is suggested that future lease forms
should provide for cases where a well is not a dry hole but yet
cannot produce in paying quantities.
A second problem is presented by the 30-day clause. The trial
court and the court of appeals" construed the word "operations"
in this sentence in its broader meaning. Under this interpretation
the lease would remain in force so long as operations of any kind
were being prosecuted on the land. The supreme court, giving a
more limited interpretation, stated that the sentence applied only
to the particular operations on Well No. 1 which were in progress
at the end of the term.
It is submitted that the word "operations" is susceptible to
either interpretation. The dissenting justices 2 preferred the
broader interpretation, since the parties could have inserted the
adjective "such" or word of like import had they intended the
more limited meaning. At any rate, future lease forms should
carry some adjective limiting the word "operations." In this case
10 St. Louis Royalty Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 193 F. 2d 778 (5th Cir. 1952).
11 Rogers v. Osborn, 250 S. W. 2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
12 Justices Culver and Garwood.
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the parties probably intended the meaning to be as construed by
the supreme court. The 30-day clause is usually intended to cover
situations where, at the end of the primary term, there is no
production but lessee is engaged in drilling operations. The
phrase, "thirty (30) consecutive days," relates only to the cessa-
tion of drilling or re-working operations in a particular well and
not to the time interval between completion of such operations in
one well and commencement of additional operations in another
well. The time interval between wells is provided in the 60-day
clause."8
The Skelly Oil case contained a special drilling clause as
follows:
If the lessee shall commence to drill a well within the term of this
lease or any extension thereof, the lessee shall have the right to drill
such well to completion with reasonable diligence and dispatch, and
if oil or gas, or either of them, be found in paying quantities, this
lease shall continue and be in force with like effect as if such well had
been completed within the term of years herein first mentioned. (Em-
phasis added.)
The lessee contended that the drilling of the first well at the
end of the primary term was sufficient to cause an extension of
the lease and that any well commenced within the term of the
extension gave the lessee the right to complete the second well
after the expiration of the extended term.
The district court 4 held as follows:
... the lease terminates at the end of the definite term as set out in the
habendum clause with the provision that upon a condition subsequent
being met, i.e., the completion of a well commenced within the term
for which delay rentals are paid and resulting in a producer, then the
lease will be reinstated and will relate back to the original term of the
lease, enabling the "thereafter" clause of the habendum to become
operative.
Is Kerr, Maintaining the Lease in Effect Other Than by Payment of Delay Rentals
and Shut-in Royalties, FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAs LAW AND TAXATION
(Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1953) 337, 372-376.
14 Wickham v. Skelly Oil Co., 106 F. Supp. 61, 69 (E. D. Okla. 1952).
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The court of appeals affirmed, saying, "To hold otherwise would
give to a simple conditional well completion clause the meaning
and effect of a continuous drilling or development clause .... 15
The lessee relied strongly upon the case of Simons v. McDaniel,l0
which held that the grant to a lessee of the right to commence a
well at any time within the term fixed by the lease contract, by
necessary legal implication, carried with it the right to complete
the well after the period fixed for commencement had expired.
The Simons case differs from the Skelly case in that the deed had
no express provision for the completion of a well after the primary
term (well completion clause). However, the court used words
implying that the lease continued in effect until completion of
the well. The court said, ".... where a well has been commenced
under a drilling clause, the lease by its terms is continued in
force pending completion in good faith of the well.... ,17
The court of appeals held the Simons case to be inapplicable
since it involved implied provisions of a lease whereas the Skelly
case involved an express provision. The express provision was
held controlling, and the correct interpretation of the provision
was said to be that the lease terminated at the end of the primary
term subject to the right in the lessee to complete a well already
being drilled. If the well resulted in a producer in paying quan.
tities, the lease would be reinstated.
Mr. Hawley C. Kerr,18 one of the attorneys for the lessees in
the Skelly case, contends, "This statement ... [in the well com-
pletion clause] that the lease 'shall continue' necessarily pre-
supposes that the lease had remained in force 'pending comple.
tion' of the well-otherwise there would be nothing to continue.
A separate and distinct continuation of the lease was thus provided
for in addition to the extension 'pending completion' ..... "
15 202 F. 2d at 446.
16 154 Okla. 168, 7 P. 2d 419 (1932).
17 7 P. 2d at 421.
18 Supra note 13, at 375.
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PRIMARY TERM OF ROYALTY DEED - CONSTRUCTION-
PRODUCTION WITHIN SIX-MONTH PERIOD
Texas. The case of Clark v. Holchak19 presents the question of
the interpretation of a term royalty deed reading as follows:
. .. in case there is no paying production on said land on December 10,
1945, and for six months thereafter,... this grant shall become null
and void .... but should there be such production, then and in that
event, this grant shall remain in full force and effect until such produc-
tion ceases, after which this instrument shall become null and void.
Plaintiff, grantee under the deed, was unable to get production
before December 10, 1945, but he did obtain paying production
before the expiration of the six-month period thereafter. He
brought suit for a declaratory judgment establishing his right to
the royalty interest under the deed. The trial court sustained a
special exception to his petition for failure to allege "that there
was paying production on said land on December 10, 1945,
which continued for six months thereafter." The court of civil
appeals" affirmed stating, "We think the contract is capable of
no interpretation except that the property interest reverted in the
absence of paying production on December 10, 1945."
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and remanded. It held
that beginning production within the six months' period after
December 10, 1945, was sufficient under the habendum clause in
question to keep the grant in force until production ceased. The
court said that a wrong approach had been made to the problem.
The subject matter of the provision under review was "no produc-
tion" and not "production." Under the clause in question, two
elements must concur in order to bring about a reverter, namely,
"no paying production" on December 10 and "no paying produc-
tion" for six months thereafter. "If there was paying produc-
tion on any day of the six months' period, then the absence of
19 ------------ Tex ............. 254 S. W. 2d 101, 2 OI & GAS REP. 273 (1953).
20 Clark v. Holchak, 247 S. W. 2d 463, 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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production on December 10 did not continue to exist for six
months," said the court.2 '
It is submitted that the construction of the provision by the
court was correct. The effect of adding the six months provision
was simply to define the primary term of the grant as the desig-
nated number of years, or other designated time period, plus six
months. Although no reason for its use is known to the writer,
this type of form has been in use for some time.22 Most term
royalty forms have been subject to criticism because of their
failure to keep abreast with the modern lease forms.
The court stated that, should there be paying production after
the date of the deed which ceased prior to December 10, the
grant would not terminate under the clause in question unless for
the six months' period following that date there should be no
paying production. From this statement the question arises as to
whether production started but ceasing within the six months'
period would terminate the lease at the date of cessation of
operations even though that date be before the end of the six
months' period. Under the holding in this case it would seem
that once the primary term is defined, the interest will continue
for at least that long, regardless of whether production starts and
then ceases during the term. However, there are some dicta to
the effect that the primary term loses significance when a well
is drilled. The case of Tennant v. Matthews23 states that when a
lessee elects to commence operations in lieu of continued payment
of delay rentals, he loses his right to keep the lease in force by
the payment of rentals. "... . [H] aving elected to begin operations,
the lease could be kept in force thereafter in only one of two
ways, viz.: (1) By discovering oil or gas in paying quantities;
or (2) by continuing such operations. 24
21 254 S. W. 2d at 103.
22 See Bain v. Strance, 256 S. W. 2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) er. ref. n.r.e., for
a recent case involving the same type of deed. The court in its interpretation of the
deed followed the principal case.
29 Tennant v. Matthews, 19 S. W. 2d 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) er. ref.
24 Id. at 1117.
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It is doubtful whether this dictum is logically applicable to
modern lease forms. Such forms usually contain a clause allow-
ing additional drilling or reworking operations to be commenced
within a specified time after cessation of production or allowing
the resumption of payment of delay rentals if the cessation occurs
within the primary term. The dictum is clearly not applicable to
a term mineral or royalty grant.
Jim Bliss.
